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Abstract
Negative utterances and words have been found to be stronger than positive 
utterances and words, but what happens if positive and negative utterances are 
intensified? Two online experiments were carried out in which participants judged 
the strength of (un)intensified positive and negative evaluations in written dialogues. 
Both studies showed intensified language was perceived as stronger than unmarked 
language (i.e., language that was not intensified), and negative evaluations were 
stronger than positive evaluations. What is more, intensification and polarity interact; 
the increment of perceived strength for intensified positive adjectives (Study 1) and 
purely intensified adverbs (really, very; Study 2) was bigger than the increment in 
perceived strength of intensified negative adjective and adverbs. When a meaningful 
intensifier (deliciously, disgustingly) was used, the negativity effect remained. The 
findings were discussed within cognitive frameworks such as relevance theory, theory 
of mind, and theory on verbal aggression.
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Many consumers who seek information about a hotel’s or a restaurant’s services and 
products read online reviews or other evaluations via social media (electronic 
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word-of-mouth, eWOM; Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, Walsch, & Gremler, 2004). 
Depending on their positive or negative expressions, these messages will affect con-
sumers’ attitudes, behavioral intentions, and (buying) behaviors (e.g., Ha, 2004; 
Reichheld & Schefter, 2000; Ward & Lee, 2000).
Negative and positive messages seem to have different effects. Previous studies 
showed negative evaluations had a greater impact on people than positive evalua-
tions did. For example, if consumers read a set of online reviews containing equal 
amounts of positive and negative reviews, their attitude toward the reviewed topic 
was more negative (e.g., Purnawirawan, De Pelsmacker, & Dens, 2015). The imbal-
ance in relative strength of negativity and positivity was observed not only for 
eWOM but also for other fields such as journalism (e.g., Soroka, 2006), organiza-
tional communication (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), and (political) advertising 
(e.g., Newhagen & Reeves, 1991). Although the majority of the findings indicates 
negativity outweighs positivity, some experimental studies and meta-analyses 
nuanced the robustness of this negativity effect, showing that inter alia setting (e.g., 
consumer environments: Ahluwalia, 2002; political advertising: Allen & Burrell, 
2002) and textual factors (e.g., type of information: Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; 
message framing: Block & Keller, 1995; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006) could reduce the 
impact of negativity.
In their meta-analysis concerning gain and loss frames, O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) 
discussed linguistic examples of prior framing studies and observed a mixture of mul-
tiple concepts in the experimental materials that might have affected experimental 
outcomes. We observed another influencing factor as well: Operationalization of the 
experimental materials was not equally balanced with respect to positivity and nega-
tivity. Items such as a healthy heart or healthy skin are not true antonyms of a heart 
disease or skin cancer (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).
Based on O’Keefe and Jensen (2006), we suggest the large variety of language use 
in prior experimental materials is an alternative explanatory factor of the equivocal 
findings of the negativity effect. In order to examine this assumption, we focused on 
the role of language use in negative and positive messages by using true antonyms in 
the experimental materials. Moreover, we also investigated whether an intensification 
of language affected the perception of negative and positive messages. These so-called 
language intensifiers are known as linguistic elements that strengthen evaluative utter-
ances (e.g., Liebrecht, 2015), and can enhance attitude change (e.g., M. A. Hamilton 
& Hunter, 1998; M. A. Hamilton, Hunter, & Burgoon, 1990).
Evaluations containing language intensifiers are generally perceived as stronger 
than evaluations without these elements (i.e., unmarked evaluations; e.g., J. W. 
Bowers, 1963; Burgers & De Graaf, 2013, Study 2; Liebrecht, 2015). These ele-
ments might affect the perception of the strength of negative or positive evaluations. 
Since we know messages containing either language intensity or negativity are per-
ceived as stronger than unmarked evaluations or positive evaluations, we investigate 
whether the combination of negativity and intensification has a cumulative effect, or 
whether the intensification affects polarity differently, in the sense that intensifica-
tion moderates the effect of polarity.
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To our knowledge, the combination of the two phenomena has not yet been system-
atically investigated. Because research material is generally not fully included in the 
method sections or appendices of the reported experiments, it is difficult to discern a 
clear pattern of the effects of polarity and intensity in previous work (Liebrecht, 2015). 
Moreover, the ambiguous findings of both factors in prior research require more atten-
tion. We anticipate that language intensity will shed a new light on the negativity 
effect. Bad is stronger than good, but is worse equally stronger than better? Is there 
still an imbalance in the perception of the strength of negative and positive evaluations 
if intensifiers are used? This article focuses on the role of polarity and intensification 
and, more specifically, on evaluative words and their true antonyms and the intensified 
equivalents of these words.
Understanding the Negativity Effect
The negativity effect can be explained with the help of cognitive psychological 
research that showed negative utterances are perceived as stronger than positive 
ones (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; D. L. Hamilton & 
Huffman, 1971; Wyer, 1974). Negative utterances get more attention, arouse more 
emotions, have more influence on recipient behavior, and are stored better and lon-
ger in memory (Baumeister et al., 2001; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Lagerwerf, 
Boeynaems, van Egmond-Brussee, & Burgers, 2015; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; 
Pratto & John, 1991).
Two theories explain the strong effects of negativity. First, negative messages are 
powerful for evolutionary reasons. Because negativity is often associated with fear or 
danger, and positivity with security and safety, at a cognitive level, a person automati-
cally pays more attention to unpleasant (negative) than to pleasant (positive) informa-
tion. This psychological phenomenon is called the Negativity bias (Jing-Schmidt, 
2007; Parkinson, 1995; Pratto & John, 1991).
Second, negative messages are perceived as stronger at a social level. The 
Pollyanna principle states there is a universal human tendency to use and expect 
positive evaluative words (Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Jing-Schmidt, 2007). 
Language users expect a positive message because of their learned behavior based 
on conventions such as politeness and face protection (Brown & Levinson, 1987). 
According to Taylor (1991), people have a universal tendency to see and tell things 
from the bright side of life. Even when people receive a negative message, they will 
try to weaken it or to make something positive out of it (Taylor, 1991). However, 
when the message appears to be irrefutably negative, then the violation of the (posi-
tive) expectation makes the (negative) message more intense. Since a positive mes-
sage is default, the negative message is marked and, therefore, perceived as stronger. 
This so-called contrast effect was already described by Skowronski and Carlston 
(1989). Because the stronger effects of negativity can be hypothesized with both 
the Negativity bias and the Pollyanna principle, we consider these two theories to 
be two sides of the same coin.
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The Strength of Language Intensity
An evaluation can range from (moderately) positive (a good hotel) to strongly positive 
(a great hotel) or from (moderately) negative (a bad hotel) to strongly negative (a ter-
rible hotel). An evaluation is the linguistic expression of personal feelings, attitudes, 
or value judgments toward an object, situation, or process (Thompson & Hunston, 
2000). The stylistic devices that strengthen evaluations are language intensifiers.
The definition of language intensity is somewhat problematic. J. W. Bowers (1963) 
is often cited as the founder of language intensity research. Language intensity is 
defined by him as “the quality of language which indicates the degree to which the 
speaker’s attitude toward a concept deviates from neutrality” (p. 345). This definition 
would require us to define neutrality. Typical of intensified language, however, is that 
it occurs in evaluative speech. Evaluative language cannot be neutral, nor is every 
evaluative utterance intense (for an extensive discussion, see Van Mulken & Schellens, 
2012). Furthermore, an evaluation is intensified if it contains an element that adds 
strength to it. The strength of an utterance is the force of the impact an utterance has 
on the perceiver, either in a positive direction or in a negative direction.
A better definition is suggested by Liebrecht (2015), who claims a linguistic ele-
ment in an evaluation is an intensifier when the omission or replacement of the same 
element results in a less strong evaluation. Intensification can be achieved in many 
ways: Words can be replaced (great instead of good), words can be added (extraordi-
narily good instead of good), or stylistic figures (e.g., metaphors, He drowned in a sea 
of grief instead of He was very sad) and typographical elements (nice!!! instead of 
nice) can be used (Renkema, 1997). Language intensifiers change the stylistic strength 
(cf. M. A. Hamilton & Hunter, 1998) of an evaluation.
The effect of language intensity on recipients has often been studied by means of 
experiments (for an overview, see Liebrecht, 2015; Van Mulken & Schellens, 2012). 
The results were not unequivocal. In some studies, language intensity seemed to 
increase the clarity and credibility of the message (M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990) with a 
positive effect on the attitude of the receiver (e.g., Buller et al., 2000; M. A. Hamilton 
& Stewart, 1993; Rogan & Hammer, 1998). In other experiments, no—or opposite—
differences were found between intensified and unintensified evaluations (e.g., J. W. 
Bowers, 1963; Burgers & De Graaf, 2013, Study 1; Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Hornikx, 
Pieper, & Schellens, 2008).
There are three explanations for these mixed findings. The first main explanation 
relates to the definition and operationalization of language intensity (for an extensive 
discussion, see Liebrecht, Hustinx, Van Mulken, & Schellens, 2016; Van Mulken & 
Schellens, 2012). Based on J. W. Bowers’s (1963) definition, scholars operationalized 
the concept in their experimental materials differently. The experimental texts differed 
in evaluative nature and genre (such as news articles; e.g., Burgers & De Graaf, 2013, 
or advertisements; e.g., Hornikx et al., 2008). Moreover, the intensified texts were 
compared with texts containing less strong evaluations (e.g., ill-considered instead of 
stupid; cf. M. A. Hamilton & Hunter, 1998), texts with extensifiers (e.g., absolutely 
instead of probably; cf. Burgers & De Graaf, 2013, Study 2), or texts without 
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evaluations (e.g., these essential questions instead of these questions; cf. Anderson & 
Blackburn, 2004). The variety of evaluation levels in the experimental texts may 
account for the ambiguous findings.
Regarding the operationalization of language intensity, it appeared the manipula-
tion of intensity was not always concerned with only the stylistic strength of the utter-
ance but sometimes affected the content of the utterances as well. We acknowledge, 
for example, the death of a person is a more forceful and impactful event than the 
injury of a person (cf. M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990). The modification of injury into 
death is what we call a content-related modification. The difference between good and 
fantastic is what we would call a stylistic intensification. In order to investigate the 
effects of language intensity more systematically, we will only focus on stylistic inten-
sity instead of content-related strength.
The second explanation concerns the influence of other variables scholars included 
in their studies. In particular, Hamilton and colleagues addressed the effects of lan-
guage intensity in combination with other variables such as source credibility (e.g., M. 
A. Hamilton & Hunter, 1998; M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990), attitude discrepancy 
between source and language user (e.g., Aune & Kikuchi, 1993; M. A. Hamilton et al., 
1990; McEwen & Greenberg, 1970), and gender (Burgoon, Jones, & Stewart, 1975; 
M.A. Hamilton & Stewart, 1993). All these variations in language intensity research 
might be accountable for the mixed effects; therefore, we propose to investigate the 
effects of language intensity more systematically by excluding confounding factors.
The third explanation for the mixed findings in language intensity research could 
be related to the polarity of the texts. Although the valence of the texts has never 
been taken into account as a factor in experimental studies, and although the amount 
of studies that reported the valence of the experimental materials is low, in studies 
where positive messages were used (e.g., arguing for a statement), persuasive 
effects of language intensity were more often found than in studies where negative 
messages were used (e.g., arguing against a statement; Liebrecht, 2015). In addi-
tion, the meta-analysis of M. A. Hamilton and Hunter (1998) indicated that findings 
of language intensity across studies were homogeneous in both high-discrepancy 
messages (i.e., more negative from the receiver’s point of view) and in low-discrep-
ancy messages (i.e., more positive from the receiver’s point of view). These find-
ings might indicate polarity plays a significant role in the effects of language 
intensity since recipients react differently to positive messages than they do to 
negative messages. To put it differently, it is worthwhile to investigate whether 
message polarity interacts with the intensity of the evaluation.
Polarity and Stylistic Strength
Literature in which the relationship between polarity and stylistic strength is addressed 
is scarce and varies in methodological quality. In linguistics, scholars have mainly 
investigated the perceived strength of (English) single words with perception studies 
in which participants assessed positive and negative words on Likert-type scales. 
These studies showed rankings from the most positive to the most negative words and 
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indicate that the most negative words were perceived more negatively than the posi-
tive words were perceived as positive (e.g., Feldman, 1966; Jones & Thurstone, 1955). 
Furthermore, various lists have been constructed to show the effects of words or pic-
tures on factors such as valence (i.e., polarity) and arousal (see the Affective Norms for 
English Words by Bradley & Lang, 1999 and the International Affective Picture System 
by Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Such scores can be used to compose standard-
ized wordlists with strength values (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013) that 
have already been applied in the field of (automatic) sentiment analysis. In this field, 
the sentiment of a message is most often based on the calculation of the sentiment 
scores of individual (English) words in wordlists (e.g., De Rijke et al., 2013; Na, Lee, 
Nam, & Lee, 2009). However, the reliability of crowd-sourced approaches is highly 
questionable, and these measures did not take into account the contexts in which these 
words appeared.
Evidence for the effect of language use on polarity was found in research involving 
questionnaires. Kamoen, Holleman, and Van den Bergh (2007) studied wording effects 
in surveys. They found that people were more hesitant to endorse a negatively formu-
lated question (such as How boring was this text?) than a positively formulated ques-
tion (How interesting was this text?). Subsequent studies also showed that the 
participants were more likely to disagree with negatively formulated questions and 
statements than to agree with the positive counterparts (Kamoen, Holleman, Mak, 
Sanders, & Van den Bergh, 2011). These results indicated the participants perceived 
the negatively formulated questions as more negative than the positively formulated 
questions as positive. In these studies, the unmarked negative and positive evaluative 
words were taken into account (boring/interesting); the effect of language intensity 
(mind-numbing/fascinating) was left out of consideration.
In this article, we aim to explore the effects of polarity and language intensity. Will 
the positive–negative asymmetry remain, or will language intensity nullify the nega-
tivity effect? It is possible that adding language intensity to negative and positive 
evaluations will not affect the negativity effect at all, which would mean both phenom-
ena simply have a cumulative effect. Put statistically, we would then expect to find 
only two main effects. On the other hand, polarity and intensity may also interact. This 
can be explained by cognitive frameworks such as relevance theory (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1994) and theory of mind (Lieberman, 2013); both describe the ability to 
attribute mental states to others.
Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1994) argues that utterances convey a num-
ber of conscious and unconscious implicatures that receivers should decode to 
understand their communicative intentions correctly. Messages are, therefore, only 
perceived to be relevant when the sender manifestly marks them as having a com-
municative intention, thus being ostensive (Carston, 2008; Tendahl, 2009). Following 
this theory, language intensifiers could be seen as ostensiveness markers. The addi-
tion of intensifiers could acquire more attention in positive evaluations than in nega-
tive evaluations, because positivity is the default. Deviation from the default means 
either negativity or intensified positivity. Therefore, when using an intensified posi-
tive message, the sender manifestly signals the positivity of the message, whereas 
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the use of an intensified negative message calls attention to the intensity of the mes-
sage. Since unmarked negative messages are perceived to be stronger than unmarked 
positive messages, the impact of positive intensity will be relatively greater than the 
impact of negative intensity.
A similar expectation can be formulated with the help of theory of mind, a cogni-
tive theory that states people are able to attribute mental states such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions to themselves and others, and understand them (e.g., 
Lieberman, 2013). For language use, it can be reasoned that language users choose 
their words consciously in order to ensure the recipient will interpret the message 
correctly (in other words, they mentalize how recipients might interpret the mes-
sage; Lieberman, 2013). This is especially so if the sender wants to share a sincere 
positive evaluation in a social context where positivity is the default; here, the mes-
sage must be strengthened in order to mark the deviation from the default. 
Furthermore, following the principles of theory of mind and relevance theory, 
recipients also expect language users will try to communicate their messages as 
clearly as possible. A recipient will perceive the usage of intensifiers as intentional 
language use—especially in positive evaluations—as a marker that the positive 
evaluation deviates from the default. This might enhance the perceived strength of 
intensified positivity as more than that of intensified negativity. Our line of reason-
ing is also in accordance with language expectancy theory (Burgoon, Denning, & 
Roberts, 2002) and defaultness theory (Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015).
Hypotheses
In order to investigate the perceived strength of intensified and unmarked negative and 
positive evaluations, we conducted two online experiments in which we specifically 
focused on the perception of strength of evaluations. In order to enhance the generaliz-
ability of our findings, we operationalized language intensity in two different ways.
First, we verified whether negative evaluations were indeed perceived to be stron-
ger than positive evaluations. Since the majority of prior studies confirm this (e.g., 
Baumeister et al., 2001; Feldman, 1966; D. L. Hamilton & Huffman, 1971; Jones & 
Thurstone, 1955; Wyer, 1974), we expect that negative polarity will be perceived as 
stronger than positive polarity (Hypothesis 1 [H1]).
Second, we checked whether intensified language was indeed perceived as stronger 
than unmarked evaluative language. Scholars assume the underlying goal of intensifi-
cation is to enhance the strength of a standpoint (e.g., Aune & Kikuchi, 1993; Renkema, 
1997; Van Mulken & Schellens, 2012). In our study, it is verified this is indeed the 
case. The hypothesis, therefore, is intensified evaluations, on both the positive and 
negative sides, will be perceived as stronger than unmarked positive and negative 
evaluations (H2).
Third, based on relevance theory and theory of mind, we expect an interaction 
effect of polarity and language intensity. The interaction will show intensification 
enhances the perceived strength of positive evaluations more than the perceived 
strength of negative evaluations (H3).
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Study 1
Method
The first study focused on the intensification of adjectives in evaluations in conversa-
tional discourse. Participants judged the perceived strength of intensified and unmarked 
positive and negative evaluative utterances in Dutch.
Design. The experiment had a 2 × 2 within-participant design; intensification 
(unmarked/intensifier) was crossed with polarity (positive/negative). Each partici-
pant was exposed to all four conditions. For each condition, five different evalua-
tive domains were used: Taste, Beauty, Quality, Interest, and Intelligence. The 20 
adjectives were presented twice to the participants resulting in 40 different dia-
logues to assess per participant. Four versions of the questionnaire were constructed 
based on a balanced Latin square design. The order of the items differed per 
questionnaire.
Materials and Pretest. Since we wanted to examine the difference in strength of posi-
tive and negative intensifiers systematically, we used antonyms in order to optimize 
the different scalar positions (intensified negative—unmarked negative—unmarked 
positive —intensified positive). For example: if a person evaluates the beauty of a 
painting, he or she can be either positive or negative. The painting can be called pretty 
(positive) or ugly (negative antonym). These positive or negative adjectives can be 
intensified by other adjectives, such as wonderful (intensified positive) or horrible 
(intensified negative).
In order to select the adjectives for Study 1, two pretests were carried out; the first 
was designed for the selection of unmarked positive adjectives to set the baseline. It 
was intended that the baseline adjectives be of comparable strength. For instance, 
the strength of clever (domain Intelligence) should be relatively comparable to 
pretty (domain Beauty). For each domain, we compiled a list of approximately 20 
different adjectives based on dictionaries and Internet listings. Participants (N = 21) 
rated the perceived strength of various adjectives on an 11-point Likert-type scale 
(comparable to the study of Jones & Thurstone, 1955). The pretest resulted in five 
moderately positive adjectives whose perceived strength was comparable (mean 
strength about 2.30, Mmin = 1.90 and Mmax = 2.52 on a 5-point scale) to the evalua-
tion domains: mooi [pretty] (domain Beauty), slim [clever] (Intelligence), lekker 
[nice] (Taste), interessant [interesting] (Interest), and goed [good] (Quality).
A second pretest was carried out in order to select antonyms and intensifiers of the 
unmarked positive adjectives. Students in Dutch linguistics (N = 22) were asked to 
write down the most suitable antonym of the unmarked positive adjectives. In addi-
tion, they had to produce two intensifiers—the strongest possible single-word intensi-
fication—for the positive adjectives. In order to ensure the produced antonyms were 
true antonyms, we carried out the same test with the most common unmarked negative 
adjectives. In this test, other students in linguistics (N = 16) were asked to produce the 
most suitable antonym and two intensifiers of the unmarked negative adjectives lelijk 
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[ugly], dom [stupid], vies [nasty], saai [boring], and slecht [bad]. Finally, the most 
frequently mentioned unmarked and intensifying positive and negative adjectives 
were selected for the experiment. The intensified positive items were (in order of 
domains): prachtig [beautiful], geniaal [brilliant], heerlijk [delicious], boeiend [fasci-
nating], and geweldig [great]; the intensified negative adjectives were: afschuwelijk 
[horrible], achterlijk [retarded], smerig [revolting], slaapverwekkend [mind-numb-
ing], and vreselijk [terrible].
In short, a 2 × 2 factor (Intensity: unmarked/intensifier; Polarity: positive/nega-
tive) repeated measures mixed design was used. Each participant judged 40 dialogues 
for five evaluation domains: Beauty, Intelligence, Taste, Interest, and Quality. They 
thus evaluated two instances of each combination of factors. An additional practice 
conversation preceded the experimental dialogues.
Following Rokeach (1968), we used dialogues to set a context for the adjectives. 
In a dialogue, person A asked person B’s opinion on various topics (referring to the 
five domains). The answer of person B was operationalized with one of the four 
conditions.
In order to avoid gender-effects (cf. Burgoon et al., 1975), we did not use first 
names but referred to the dialogue partners with the expression person A and per-
son B. By choosing this way of referring to dialogue partners, we were able to avoid 
differences in source credibility (cf. M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990; M. A. Hamilton & 
Hunter, 1998). In the dialogue, we made sure person A did not advocate his or her 
own opinion or attitude, that he or she did not try to alter the opinion of person B, 
but simply asked person B to give an opinion about an event, object, or situation 
that B had recently experienced. The participant had to consider this dialogue and 
assess only the evaluative response of person B. Consequently, no possible discrep-
ancy between existing attitudes of persons A and B could interfere with the partici-
pants’ judgments (cf. M. A. Hamilton & Hunter, 1998). An example of the 
experimental materials is shown below.
A: Heb je al eens bij Da Vinci gegeten?
[Have you ever eaten in the Da Vinci restaurant?]
B: Toevallig ben ik er vorig jaar geweest. Het eten was smerig/vies/lekker/heerlijk.
[I happened to go there last year. The food was revolting/nasty/nice/delicious.]
Participants. A total of 93 Dutch participants took part in the online experiment: 13 
of them were left out; 6 participants appeared to be nonnative Dutch speakers; and 
7 participants answered yes when asked whether they were interrupted during the 
questionnaire. The remaining 80 participants had an average age of 19.4 years 
(SD = 2.19). More women (79%) than men (21%) participated. The participants 
were students in the first year of their education at the faculty of Arts at a Dutch 
university.
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Instrumentation. Each of the 40 items was followed by a 21-point Likert-type scale, 
ranging from very negative (−10) via neutral (0) to very positive (+10). To investigate 
the perceived strength of each item, the participants were asked to rate the strength of 
the expressed opinion of person B on the scale (“According to you, how strongly 
worded is the opinion of B?” hoe krachtig vind je de mening van persoon B ver-
woord?). The scale itself was unnumbered and quite long in order to encourage the 
participants to score the items based on their first impression, and not to compare the 
scores of prior answers. At the end of the questionnaire, personal data were asked: 
gender, age, education level, and mother tongue.
Procedure. The participants were invited by a research assistant during lectures at the 
faculty of Arts at a Dutch university and via e-mail. The participants took part volun-
tarily by clicking on the hyperlink, which randomly assigned each participant to one 
of the four versions of the questionnaire in the software program NetQuestionnaire. 
About half of the respondents received no reward, and half of the group (38 persons) 
received a scratch card (for the value of 1 euro) as a stimulus to participate in the 
study.1 The whole procedure took 12 to 15 minutes.
Data Analysis. We used the R statistical package (R Core Team, 2014). Mixed-model 
analyses were used with participants and items as random variables. A mixed-model 
analysis is a statistical technique that offers the advantage of directly assessing the 
significance of predictors as well as the interaction of other factors with these predic-
tors (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Quené & Van den Bergh, 2008). Moreover, it 
offers the researcher the possibility to include covariates and random slopes. Visual 
inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedastic-
ity or normality. We also report R2 scores, which are an approximation of explained 
variance for mixed models and can be directly compared to η2 measures for analyses 
of variance. The use of this measure is common in regression analyses: It helps inter-
pret the importance of effect sizes (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013).
All our models were checked to see if the addition of Gender or Age improved the 
quality of the model. This was not the case. Polarity and intensity were chosen as 
within-participants fixed factors. In the statistical models reported below, we, there-
fore, included only fixed and random predictors that were significant. Both models 
were controlled for the within-subjects nature of the task by including random effects 
for items with a variance components covariance structure and restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation.
Results
First, we verified whether participants used the strength scale correctly. Since the scale 
is unconventional, and since it is not inconceivable that a person would interpret the 
strength of a negative word in positive terms, we anticipated mistakes in the polarity 
of the strength. However, in only a few cases, participants rated a positive item with a 
negative score, or vice versa. We removed 188 of the total 3,019 data points (6.23%). 
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Analysis of the removed values revealed some participants had more missing values 
than others, probably indicating they had more difficulty with the scale. For items, the 
missing values were more evenly distributed.
Information criteria were calculated between an empty model with only the ran-
dom factors and the complete model including all factors. Table 1 presents the 
information criteria for this model with a χ2 test to test whether decreases are sig-
nificant. Table 2 shows the mean scores on Perceived Strength broken down for 
Polarity and Intensity.
We included Polarity, Intensity, and the interaction of both as predictors in the 
model, with participants and items as random factor. R2 for this model was .29.
Table 3 shows the final model for Perceived Strength in adjectives. Polarity signifi-
cantly predicted Perceived Strength, b = −.81; t(2887.2) = −7.83, p < .001. Negative 
polarity was perceived as more forceful than positive polarity. This is what was 
expected. Intensity also significantly predicted Perceived Strength, b = 1.67, t(2885.4) 
= 15.86, p < .001. As expected, an increase in intensity was also perceived as 
Table 1. Deviance Values (−2 Log likelihood) and Degrees of Freedom (df) for Mixed-
Model Analyses in Study 1.
Deviance Null model (df) Complete model (df) χ2 test
Perceived strength 13180 (4) 12620 (7) χ2(3) = 560*
*p < .001.
Table 2. Mean Scores on Perceived Strength Broken Down for Polarity and Intensity.
Polarity/intensity
Positive Negative
M SD M SD
Unmarked 4.31 2.14 5.15 2.32
Intensifier 6.41 2.31 6.84 2.34
Note. We used the absolute values of the reported scores on the 21-point Likert-type scale from −10 
to +10 to answer the research question.
Table 3. Statistical Model for Perceived Strength in Study 1.
Fixed effects b t (df) p
Intercept 5.13 29.68 (142.8) <.001
Polarity −.81 −7.83 (2887.2) <.001
Intensity 1.67 15.86 (2885.4) <.001
Intensity * Polarity 0.42 3.03 (2892.2) <.001
Note. df = degrees of freedom. The Intercept represents a negative unmarked adjective. Effect size R2 for 
fixed effects with standardized generalized variance = 0.29 (based on Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013).
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stronger. It shows the effect for intensity was twice as strong as the effect of polarity. 
There was also a small ordinal interaction effect of Polarity and Intensity, b = .42, 
t(2892.2) = 3.03, p < .001, supporting our hypothesis: The increment in strength for 
intensified positive adjectives was more substantial than for intensified negative 
adjectives.
Discussion
Negative evaluations were perceived to be stronger than positive evaluations; 
intensified evaluations were perceived to be stronger than unmarked evaluations; 
and this effect was perceived to be twice as strong. So far so good. However, we 
also found some evidence that intensifiers add more strength to evaluations with 
positive adjectives than to evaluations with negative adjectives. Thus, the effect of 
language intensity seems to be somewhat greater on the positive side than on the 
negative side.
However, although our materials were thoroughly selected with the help of pretests, 
a caveat should be taken into account: Intensifiers vary in semantic meaning (Liebrecht, 
Hustinx, Van Mulken, & Schellens, 2018). We cannot close our eyes to the fact that an 
adjective such as brilliant also adds luminosity to the evaluation or an intensifier such 
as excellent adds outstandingness. These semantic modifications, although small, may 
have influenced the outcome of our study. Therefore, a second study was carried out 
in which the meaningfulness of intensifiers was taken into account. For this, we 
selected adverbs instead of adjectives. In this word class, a clear distinction can be 
made between pure adverbial intensifiers (very) that do not contain any semantic 
meaning, and meaningful adverbial intensifiers (wonderfully), that do contain seman-
tic meaning (e.g., “stuff to wonder about”). Furthermore, by examining adverbial 
intensifiers instead of adjectives, our findings in Study 1 can be replicated for other 
modes of intensification.
More important, by making a distinction in the semantic modifications of intensi-
fiers, we can investigate more deeply how deviation from the default works. Adverbs 
allow us to keep the grammatical category constant and at the same time permit us to 
stipulate whether it is indeed intensity that moderates negativity. If the third hypothesis 
also holds true for adverbs, then it certainly must hold true for pure intensifiers, where 
only intensification is added to the equation.
Study 2
The first hypotheses in Study 2 remained the same as in Study 1: Negative evaluations 
are perceived to be stronger than positive ones (H1), and intensification leads to 
increased perceived strength (H2). We also expected intensifiers that contain semantic 
meaning to have a stronger effect than intensifiers that only intensify (pure intensifi-
ers). To put it differently: an adverb such as very or really will be perceived as less 
powerful than adverbs such as disgustingly. Therefore, we predict meaningful intensi-
fiers are perceived as stronger than pure intensifiers (H2a).
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We expected to again find the incremental impact of positive intensification is 
larger than the effect of negative intensification. We, therefore, hypothesized that neg-
ative evaluations with pure intensifiers are perceived to be lower in strength than posi-
tive evaluations with pure intensifiers (H3a) and that meaningful intensifiers in 
negative evaluations are perceived as less strong than meaningful intensifiers in posi-
tive evaluations (H3b).
Method
Design. Study 2 had a 3 × 2 within-participant design, with intensification (unmarked/
pure intensifier/meaningful intensifier) and polarity (positive/negative) as factors. 
Each participant saw all six conditions in all five evaluative domains. So, in total, each 
participant rated 30 items. Six versions of the questionnaire were constructed based on 
a balanced Latin square. The questionnaires differed in order of the items.
Materials and Pretest. The materials and written dialogues of Study 1 served as the 
basis for the materials of Study 2. However, the factor intensification was operational-
ized differently. Instead of adjectives, adverbs were used to intensify the unmarked 
evaluations of Study 1. For example, an unmarked positive adjective was strengthened 
with the addition of the pure intensifier zeer [very] or the meaningful intensifier ver-
rukkelijk [deliciously] (producing “verrukkelijk lekker [deliciously nice]”).
The meaningfulness of the intensifying adverbs was pretested in a manner compa-
rable to the first pretest in Study 1. Participants (N = 27) rated the meaningfulness of 
positive and negative intensified evaluations that differed in semantic modification 
(e.g., het eten was lekker [the meal was nice] and was intensified with e.g., zeer/
enorm/verrukkelijk [very/tremendously/deliciously]) on 7-point Likert-type scales (3 
items, α = .86). Based on the results, the meaningful and pure intensifiers were 
selected for the experiment.
Participants. Participants who took less than 5 minutes to complete the questionnaire 
were removed from the sample; 91 participants remained. However, one participant 
was a nonnative speaker of Dutch, and was, therefore, removed from the sample as 
well. The remaining 90 Dutch participants had an average age of 29.8 years (SD = 
13.34) and 78% of them were female. Almost all participants were students or had 
already obtained a bachelor’s or master’s degree (98.9%).
Instrumentation. Each item was followed by a 21-point scale, ranging from very nega-
tive (−10) via neutral (0) to very positive (+10). For this study, a slider was used 
(unavailable for Study 1). The same operationalization of perceived strength was used. 
At the end of the questionnaire, personal data were requested (gender, age, level of 
education, mother tongue).
Procedure. Participants voluntarily enrolled in the experiment after their attention was 
drawn during lectures at the faculty of Humanities at a Dutch university (a different 
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university than Study 1) and via social media. By clicking on a hyperlink, the partici-
pant was randomly assigned to one of the six versions of the questionnaire. Answering 
all questions took from 12 to 15 minutes.
Results
Before testing the hypotheses, we verified whether participants used the strength scale 
correctly. Unfamiliar with the rating scale, some participants rated a positive item with 
a negative score, or vice versa. We removed 271 of the total 2,700 data points (10.04%). 
Similar to Study 1, analysis of the removed values revealed some participants had 
more missing values then others, but for items the missing values were more evenly 
distributed.
In order to test our hypotheses for Study 2, information criteria were calculated 
between an empty model with only participant and items as random factors, and the 
complete model including all factors (see Table 4). Table 5 shows the mean scores on 
Perceived Strength broken down for Polarity and Type of Intensifier (levels: Unmarked, 
Pure Intensifier, Meaningful Intensifier).
The full model (Table 6) included Polarity, Type of Intensifier, and the interaction 
of Type of Intensifier and Polarity as predictors, items, and participants as random fac-
tor. R2 for this model was .76.
Polarity significantly predicted perceived strength, b = −1.33, t(540.2) = 8.07, p < 
.001. Again, as expected, negative polarity was perceived as stronger than positive 
polarity. Type of Intensifier also significantly predicted Perceived Strength. Pairwise 
Table 4. Information Criteria (2 Restricted Log Likelihood) for Mixed-Model Analyses in 
Study 2.
Deviance Null model (df) Complete model (df) χ2 test
Perceived strength 11728 (4) 10548 (9) χ2(5) = 1193*
Note. df = degrees of freedom.
*p < .001.
Table 5. Mean Scores on Perceived Strength Broken Down for Polarity and Type of 
Intensifier in Study 2.
Polarity/type of intensifier
Positive Negative
M SD M SD
Unmarked 3.59 2.01 4.64 2.49
Pure intensifier 5.73 2.63 6.56 2.65
Meaningful intensifier 7.14 2.88 8.59 2.58
Note. df = degrees of freedom. We used the absolute values of the reported scores on the 21-point 
Likert-type scale from −10 to +10 to answer the research question.
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comparisons (Bonferroni) revealed all three types of intensifiers differed significantly 
from each other, and evaluations without intensifiers were perceived as less strong 
than evaluations with meaningful and pure intensifiers. In turn, pure intensifiers were 
found to be less strong than meaningful intensifiers: unmarked intensifiers, b = −3.9, 
t(2330.4) = 27.68, p < .001; pure intensifiers, b = −2.08, t(2333) = −14.48, p < .001. 
Again, there was also a small interaction effect of polarity and type of intensifier. 
Inspection (Bonferroni) revealed only positive pure intensifiers differed significantly 
from negative pure intensifiers, b = 0.63, t(2332.3) = 3.22, p = .001). The increase in 
experienced strength for positive pure intensifiers compared to the increase in strength 
of the negative pure intensifiers was slightly more substantial.
Discussion
The findings of Study 2 supported and clarified the findings of Study 1. In all cases, 
negative evaluations were perceived to be stronger than positive evaluations, and 
unmarked evaluations were less strong than intensified evaluations. We again found a 
small interaction effect. Intensification affected the effect of polarity but only for pure 
intensifiers. The discrepancy between the strength of negative and positive utterances 
was slightly moderated by intensification: The increment of perceived strength for 
purely intensifying adverbs was bigger than the increment in perceived strength of 
intensifying negative adverbs. This is in accordance with H3a. Meaningful intensifica-
tion, on the other hand, did not show this expected pattern; therefore, we found no 
support for H3b in the current study. In the General Discussion section, we will elabo-
rate on these findings.
General Discussion
In this article, we reported two experimental studies in which we measured the 
perceived strength of positive and negative evaluations in written dialogues. Our 
studies confirmed the negativity effect, as predicted by the negativity bias and the 
Pollyanna principle (e.g., Jing-Schmidt, 2007; Parkinson, 1995; Pratto & John, 
Table 6. Statistical Model for Perceived Strength in Study 2.
Fixed effects b t (df) p
Intercept 8.38 38.06 (159.3) <.001
Type of intensifier (pure) −2.08 −14.48 (2333) <.001
Type of intensifier (unmarked) −3.9 −27.68 (2330.4) <.001
Polarity −1.33 −8.07 (540.2) <.001
Pure Intensifier * Polarity 0.63 3.22 (2332.3) .001
Meaningful Intensifier * Polarity 0.3 1.53 (2327.9) n.s.
Note. df = degrees of freedom. The intercept represents a negative meaningful evaluation. Effect size R2 
for fixed effects with standardized generalized variance = .76 (based on Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013).
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1991), and the intensification effect (J. W. Bowers, 1963; Burgers & De Graaf, 
Study 2; Liebrecht, 2015).
We also found the negativity effect can be modified by intensification. Although 
the effect was small, on two occasions we found intensification affects the effect of 
polarity. We found this in Study 1, with intensified adjectives; we found it again in 
Study 2, with intensified adverbs, although only for pure intensifiers (such as very or 
really). The increment of perceived strength for intensified positive adjectives and 
purely intensified adverbs was bigger than the increment in perceived strength of 
intensified negative adjectives and adverbs. Cognitive theories such as relevance the-
ory (Sperber & Wilson, 1994) or the theory of mind (e.g., Lieberman, 2013) may 
explain these findings. Since an unmarked positive message is the default, intensifica-
tion of such an unmarked message comes across as stronger than an intensified nega-
tive message when compared to an unmarked negative message. Positive intensification 
stands out.
However, pure intensification is rare. In most cases, the words that are used to 
intensify contain more meaning than only intensification (Liebrecht et al., 2018). 
When words like really, very, extremely, and quite are placed in front of an adjective 
or adverb, it makes the meaning of that adjective or adverb more intense or more pow-
erful. The same is true for some types of typography: Adding exclamation marks or 
using capital letters only has the function of intensifying the message. Most words do 
more than that: They not only intensify the message but also contain extra meaning, 
and this entails a content-related modification. Words like brilliant or dazzling add a 
shining quality to what is good, and glorious and magnificent add grandeur to what is 
good. Every meaningful intensifier contains extra meaning. Since the extra meaning 
differs per word, this may explain why meaningful positive intensification does not 
outperform meaningful negative intensification. Thus, the increase in perceived 
strength of negative evaluations with a meaningful intensifier (disastrously bad) is as 
large as the increase in strength of positive evaluations with a meaningful intensifier 
(extraordinarily good).
In short, meaningful intensifiers have an additional function. It can be assumed that 
meaningful intensifiers reattract the recipient’s attention to the polarity that overrules 
the ostensiveness of intensifiers. As a result, the language user signals primarily the 
polarity of the evaluation, which activates the principles of the Negativity bias again. 
We can conclude intensifiers are able to mark a sender’s deviation from the default, 
although the strengthening effects seem to depend on the semantic modification.
Our findings bridge two existing views on language intensity. On the one hand, 
language intensity is shaped by stylistic features employed by the speaker. Words like 
very or delicious mark the unmarked evaluation nice (e.g., Bolinger, 1972; Fletcher, 
1980). Aune and Kikuchi (1993) call this actual language intensity. On the other hand, 
language intensity is a matter of perception, which was the dependent variable of the 
current study. Aune and Kikuchi (1993) call this perceived language intensity. In 
accordance with our theoretically based operationalization (actual intensity), the inten-
sified evaluations were perceived as stronger than the unintensified evaluations (per-
ceived intensity). The question is whether these two perspectives can be viewed 
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separately. Based on theory of mind, we suggest that senders might strategically use 
intensifiers to ensure recipients will interpret the message correctly, and the recipients 
would expect language users to do so as well.
The findings are based on evaluations containing true antonyms. We intentionally 
excluded other variables that were investigated extensively in prior language intensity 
research, as we first wanted to focus on and determinate the language factor. To our 
mind, the effects of source credibility (e.g., M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990; M. A. 
Hamilton & Hunter, 1998), attitude discrepancy between source and language user 
(e.g., Aune & Kikuchi, 1993; M. A. Hamilton et al., 1990; McEwen & Greenberg, 
1970), and gender (Burgoon et al., 1975; M. A. Hamilton & Stewart, 1993) can now 
be investigated in combination with language intensity and polarity.
We also found the strength of intensifiers cannot be based on standardized word 
lists with strength values such as the ones that are used with sentiment analysis (e.g., 
Warriner et al., 2013). The perspective on both polarity and language intensity is often 
lacking in previous research on language intensity (e.g., Aune & Kikuchi, 1993; 
Renkema, 1997; Van Mulken & Schellens, 2012), or on the strength of positive and 
negative words (e.g., Feldman, 1966; Jones & Thurstone, 1955). The same is true for 
disciplines such as eWOM (e.g., Ha, 2004; Purnawirawan et al., 2015; Ward & Lee, 
2000), journalism (e.g., Soroka, 2006), organizational communication (e.g., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984), and (political) advertising (e.g., Allen & Burrell, 2002). We, there-
fore, believe future research should address both factors; polarity as well as intensifi-
cation need to be included in the assessment of evaluative language.
There are some considerations and suggestions for improvement that should be 
taken into account in future research. In Study 2, the pure intensifiers were operation-
alized with three Dutch adverbial intensifiers. These words indeed contain hardly any 
semantic content, but they are frequently used in Dutch (which is also the case for the 
English alternatives very and really). High word frequency may have contributed to 
the relative impact of the pure intensifiers. High-frequency words are known to bleach 
in meaning, and they are usually perceived as less strong than low-frequency words 
(Liebrecht et al., 2018). To investigate the robustness of our results, it is relevant to 
take word frequency into account.
Our measure of perceived strength is another caveat that should be taken into 
account. One of the disadvantages of using online questionnaires is the unnatural man-
ner of assessing items on a conscious level (e.g., J. S. Bowers & Schacter, 1990; 
Newell & Shanks, 2014). In future research, we will use an alternative approach by 
means of an oral production task. If our interpretation of the results of both experi-
ments is correct, then the same pattern should be found in spoken language (following 
the findings of Wilson & Wharton, 2006). Deviation from the default will be marked 
by intentional stress on pure intensifiers in positive evaluations in comparison to 
pure intensification in negative evaluations by which the speaker will mark his 
intention to highlight the ostensive character of pure intensification. We, therefore, 
expect speakers to stress pure positive intensification more often than pure negative 
intensification. For meaningful intensifiers, however, this pattern should not be 
observed, and speakers will stress meaningful positive intensification as often as 
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meaningful negative intensification. Otherwise, a less controlled but more ecologi-
cal valid method would be a corpus study of intensified positive and negative evalu-
ations in natural spoken language, such as the Spoken Dutch Corpus project that 
comprises about 1,000 hours of speech by Dutch adults or the British National 
Corpus with over 100 million samples of written and spoken language. By means of 
these studies, not only the third-party observations of written conversations are 
examined but also the perceptions of actual communicators in spoken conversations. 
Spoken conversations are known to differ in many communicative factors such as 
visibility, audibility, simultaneity (Clark & Brennan, 1991), and paralinguistic cues, 
such as intonation, prosody, and nonverbal communication (e.g., Poyatos, 1993).
Another suggestion for future research is to include other types of intensification 
in positive and negative evaluations. For example, what is the effect of stacking 
intensifiers (a super rich tycoon)? The speed of bleaching of some intensifiers is 
worth investigating (cf. Tagliamonte & Roberts, 2005). Compare the contrasting 
combinations of originally negative and positive words (terribly good; abominably 
fun), and novel intensifiers in youth language, like in Dutch ziek mooi (lit. sick 
pretty) and kapot leuk (lit. damaging amusing), they deserve to be included in 
future effect research or corpus investigation. Culture might also be included in 
future corpus research. Dutch is fairly similar to English regarding the use of pure 
intensifiers such as very or really (although Dutch has more choice), and Dutch is 
similar to English regarding the cultural preference for hedges and nuanced modi-
fications of opinions. Cultures that are known for their more expressive communi-
cation styles may have a different perception of the intensifiers used in our studies 
and may perceive the meaningful intensifiers as less forceful than our Dutch par-
ticipants. They may also prefer a broader range of extreme intensifiers. Most 
Western languages do make the difference between pure intensifiers and meaning-
ful intensifiers, which gives rise to the expectation we will find similar results for 
other languages and cultures. This, however, remains to be investigated.
What is more, the effects of intensification and polarity should be seen in a wider 
and more social perspective. In some circumstances, language intensity in a negative 
message might be qualified as verbal aggression, and could, therefore, be included 
in verbal aggression frameworks. These frameworks are built on the basis of the 
actual usage of aggressive language and one’s attitude to aggressive language, which 
can be assessed on the Verbal Aggressiveness Scale (VAS; Infante & Wigley, 1986). 
This scale ranges from the most negatively worded items to the most benevolently 
worded items (Levine et al., 2004; Tafoya & Hamilton, 2012). However, Levine 
et al. (2004) noticed the 20 VAS items may be problematic: The most negative and 
positive end of the VAS scale appear to be loaded on not one but two factors. Such 
an asymmetry in assessing negative and positive antonyms ties in with our findings 
that also suggest an imbalance between positive and negative intensified language. 
Thus, positive polarity could also play a role in verbal aggressiveness frameworks, 
especially when it invites collaborative behavior. As “verbal aggression represents 
an imminent danger to civilized society” (M. A. Hamilton, 2012, p. 6), it is 
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worthwhile to investigate if and how the usage of intensifiers can contribute to a 
better understanding of verbal aggressiveness.
Conclusions
The relevance of our studies is threefold. First, the consistent effect we have found 
suggests the polarity of the texts, indeed, can be an explanation for the mixed results 
in previous (experimental) studies regarding the effects of language intensity. It turns 
out intensifiers in positive and negative contexts function in different ways, dependent 
on the type and meaningfulness of the intensifier.
Second, our study has shown it is necessary to investigate the effects of positive and 
negative words and expressions in context. In previous research, the strength of evalu-
ation in a text was mostly based on isolated expressions or single words. In automatic 
sentiment analysis, for example, the sentiment of a message is often based on the cal-
culation of the sentiment scores of individual words in wordlists (e.g., De Rijke et al., 
2013; Na et al., 2009). The perceived strength by real language users, however, is 
based on context and on the combination of specific words. Therefore, it is best not to 
attribute a fixed score to a text that contains an intensifier; the polarity of the text influ-
ences the strength of the evaluation.
Last, the negativity effect was found to be strong, but it can be modified. The 
Negativity bias and the Pollyanna principle predict that negative expressions are 
perceived as stronger than positive expressions. The results of our studies have 
confirmed this prediction, but the type and meaningfulness of the intensifiers also 
play a role. The negativity effect can be moderated by language intensity. Apparently, 
cognitive theories such as relevance theory or theory of mind are indispensable 
when one explains how language functions, and why it functions as it does. Based 
on our findings, we conclude intensity is a matter of the recipient’s perception, 
which is shaped by stylistic features employed by the speaker. Language users vary 
their utterances according to the context and to the receiver of their messages. 
Expectancy, ostensiveness, and knowing what the other knows are key attributes in 
analyzing language, and in predicting what the effect of language choice will be. 
Whenever language is evaluative, that is, whenever language is not descriptive or 
objective, but subjective and personal, it is of the utmost importance to include 
context and perspective, and to account for the large and sometimes unique effects 
of stylistic and meaningful connotations.
In future sentiment analyses, opinion mining will be combined with machine learn-
ing; then, consumer reviews can be treated as singular and context-bound opinions, 
hence doing justice to the fact that what a person means with a certain word may vary 
from individual to individual, and from context to context.
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